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Recent financial reporting and auditing scandals on both sides of the Atlantic have led
to a global realisation of the importance of sound corporate governance (CG) practices in
alleviating the agency problems in the corporate form of business and for efficient allocation
of capital in international markets. Transparency and disclosure (T&D) practices followed by
firms are an important component and a leading indicator of CG quality. Transparent and full-
disclosure of information is especially vital for Turkey where external capital is necessary
to sustain the high growth rate and the biggest agency problem centres on asymmetric
information and expropriation by majority shareholders.
We collaborate with Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and base our survey on their scoring
methodology, a customised version of the 98 desirable T&D attributes they used in several
other countries, and their classification of the attributes into three categories: ownership
structure and investor relations, financial transparency and information disclosure, and board
and management structures and processes. We evaluate the T&D practices of the 52 largest
and most liquid firms in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), based on their English and local
language annual reports and websites. Our rankings provide a first time, objective assessment
of the corporate disclosure practices of ISE firms and uncover that they are, at best, moderate
and vary with respect to the three sub-categories of T&D.
We also consider a simple model that sequentially links agency problems to CG/T&D
mechanisms in place, which in turn impact firm-level and economy-wide financial perfor-
mance. Concentrating on the causal side of the model – 
 
the determinants of T&D scores
 
 – we
provide out-of-sample evidence that firm size, financial performance and market-to-book
equity best explain the variation in T&D scores in the ISE. While our results provide consid-
erable support for prior findings in developed markets, they also shed light on how specific
agency problems faced by ISE firms impact their T&D scores.
Keywords: Corporate governance, transparency and disclosure index, Istanbul Stock
Exchange, agency conflicts
 
Introduction
 
he recent corporate governance and finan-
cial reporting scandals on both sides of
the Atlantic have led to a global realisation that
sound corporate governance (CG) practices
including transparency and full disclosure
T
 
(T&D) are important for long-term viability of
companies as well as for efficient allocation of
capital in the international financial markets.
Starting with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US,
many countries have experienced an unprece-
dented amount of governmental and institu-
tional intervention and are now in the process
    
of restructuring their current laws, regulations
and enforcement capabilities within the frame-
work of best corporate governance practices.
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Furthermore, academicians, investment and
data-base companies have started to construct
and evaluate ethical, socially responsible, and
strong CG indices,
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 and companies themselves
are paying hefty sums of money to have their
CG and T&D practices rated by rating agencies
such as Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Institu-
tional Shareholder Services (ISS) to signal their
quality in their quest for external capital. Par-
allel to these developments, there has been a
proliferation of country-level (La Porta 
 
et al
 
.,
1997; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2000; Gugler
 
et al
 
., 2004) and firm-level (see for example,
Ashbaugh 
 
et al
 
., 2004; Brown and Caylor, 2004)
evidence that better CG practices are associated
with lower cost of capital, higher firm values
and thus easier access to external capital.
Full disclosure and transparency of financial
information are vital components of the CG
framework (OECD, 1999) and are regarded as
important indicators of CG quality.
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 Beeks and
Brown (2005) find that firms with higher CG
quality make more informative disclosures.
Sadka (2004) provides theoretical and empiri-
cal evidence that the public sharing of finan-
cial and analyst reports have enhanced factor
productivity and economic growth in 30
countries.
These relationships and the expected bene-
fits of good CG and T&D practices are es-
pecially important for emerging markets like
Turkey because they are in dire need of external
capital as their economies grow faster than that
of more developed nations. As a result, it is
important to investigate whether the historical
scarcity of external capital flow to Turkey is
related to the low quality of T&D. This study,
which provides a first-time, objective measure-
ment of T&D quality in the Istanbul Stock
Exchange (ISE), in a form suitable for time-
series and cross-sectional comparisons, includ-
ing comparison with other sample countries
surveyed by S&P, is a first step in this direction.
Turkey is a French origin civil law country
where corporate ownership structure can be
characterised by concentrated family owner-
ship and low float rates leading to certain types
of agency problems.
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 As a result of its highly
concentrated, pyramidal, family-based owner-
ship structures, substantive inter-corporate
shareholdings, and dual class shares, the main
agency conflict centres around the expropria-
tion of minority shareholders’ rights by ulti-
mate owners with superior information even
in cases where they don’t hold a significant
amount of the cash-flow rights. The ensuing
information asymmetry between the insiders
and outsiders has resulted in low float rates
and dividend payments (for an in-depth
description of ownership structures of ISE
firms, its disadvantages in terms of investment
returns and development of the capital mar-
kets, see Yurtoglu, 2000, 2003). Furthermore,
due to the concentration of ownership and
power in influential families and its French
legal origin, Turkey has also been slow in the
development and enforcement of CG and T&D
principles and best practices.
The potential for this special kind of agency
conflict and the importance of T&D as a lead-
ing CG mechanism in alleviating its draw-
backs by reducing the asymmetry between
the insiders and outsiders have been an
important motivation of this study. This
agency problem was recently acknowledged
in a task force report of the Institute of Inter-
national Finance (4/12/2005, page 1) as the
following quote indicates: “Turkish compa-
nies are often controlled through the use of
founders’ shares that carry multiple voting
rights and/or board nominating rights. As a
result, the protection of minority shareholder
interests rests primarily on full disclosure and
accurate financial reporting”.
This study is the first attempt to create a
summary T&D index for the largest and most
liquid firms trading on the ISE. We undertook
the project in collaboration with S&P, a presti-
gious, global rating and financial services
company that has been carrying out large-
scale research since 2001 to score the T&D
practices of a number of large and liquid
firms they follow in the US, Latin America,
Europe, Japan, Russia and some emerging
Asian markets. We customised the 98 attrib-
utes used in these prior surveys and came up
with a final set of 106 attributes which not only
reflects the expertise of S&P analysts and
researchers, but also the regulatory, institu-
tional and economic environment in Turkey.
We consider the 106 attributes in three sub-
categories, again using S&P’s classification
scheme: (i) Disclosure of ownership structure
and investor relations (OwnStr); (ii) Financial
transparency and disclosure in the financial
statements (FinDisc); and (iii) Disclosure of the
board and management structure and pro-
cesses (BrdMgmt). Next, the annual reports
and the websites (both English and local lan-
guage versions) of the 52 largest and most liq-
uid firms listed in the ISE were searched for
the inclusion of these information attributes.
Each firm was then graded and ranked in the
above-mentioned three categories as well as in
their overall T&D quality.
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We find that the transparency and disclo-
sure scores of ISE companies are not impres-
sive, especially in terms of the board and
management structure and processes. Never-
    
theless, considerably high scores (7/10) are
obtained in the category of financial trans-
parency and information disclosure and the
average overall T&D score (TDS) of Turkish
companies is 5/10, a score comparable to
many countries in continental Europe.
In this paper, we draw on the agency theory
of the firm and model CG and T&D as a sys-
tem of checks and balances that has evolved
to mitigate the agency problems often encoun-
tered in the corporate form. Our expectation is
that if companies have effective mechanisms
in place, the agency problems – such as ex-
traction of private benefits by majority
shareholders, consumption of perquisites by
entrenched management, under or overinvest-
ment – and their associated costs will be miti-
gated. We base our analysis on this body of
research for the second objective of the study:
exploring the cross-sectional differences in
quality of disclosure in ISE firms. We find that
larger and more profitable firms, as well as
firms with higher information asymmetry
exhibit higher TDS to partially resolve the con-
flict with minority shareholders and regula-
tory institutions while free cash flow available
to management and leverage do not have
explanatory power. This is not surprising since
the conflict between the shareholders and
managers and creditors is not a major agency
problem in Turkey.
The study has several contributions and
is expected to be of interest to regulators,
researchers, managers and market partici-
pants. The rankings provide a first time, objec-
tive, quantitative and verifiable assessment of
corporate disclosure practices of listed compa-
nies in the ISE, encompassing not only financial
statement disclosure, but also disclosures of
shareholder’s rights and board and manage-
ment structures/processes. As such, it is
expected to be a benchmark for future longi-
tudinal and cross-country studies. Moreover,
since we use the same attributes and method-
ology of prior S&P studies, the findings
allow comparison with the scores previously
obtained in other markets. The rankings based
on a universal benchmark are expected to help
investors and other stakeholders in their
decision making as they allow an objective
assessment of differences in the level of report-
ing quality and hence investment risks across
firms, markets and sectors. The T&D rankings
can also be used as a meaningful, objective
monitoring and enforcement tool by local and
international regulators. Finally, this is the
first study that investigates the relationship
between T&D and some agency conflict
proxies prevalent in the ISE. The results
provide out-of-sample evidence that these
firm-specific characteristics do a good job in
explaining the variation in TDS as in some
other countries.
The remaining part of the paper is organised
as follows: the next section describes the poor
culture and regulation of disclosure in Turkey,
after which we discuss our simple model of
the causes and the consequences of the CG/
T&D framework and develop our hypothesis.
We then discuss prior research and the choice
of our agency conflict proxies used as deter-
minants of the T&D scores. The sample, data
requirements and methods of analysis are
described, followed by the results. The final
section concludes and presents some future
research ideas.
 
The poor regulatory framework and 
culture of CG and T&D in Turkey
 
Turkey has historically had a poor culture of
CG and T&D. It has always been a civil law
country and has had a very late start in the
liberalisation of its economy, the establishment
of its stock market (1986), and financial report-
ing standards based on generally accepted
accounting principles and the concept of full
and fair disclosure (1994).
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The first legislation concerning commercial
law was enacted for the first time in the
Ottoman Empire in 1850 and was based on
the French Code of Commerce of 1807. Under
the legal reforms of 1926, this was replaced by
a system based on Swiss Civil Code and Code
of Obligations, the Italian Penal Code, and
the German Code of Penal Procedure. Neither
these nor the present Turkish Code of Com-
merce, dating back to 1957, were based on the
generally accepted principles of accounting
and auditing and hence did not regulate finan-
cial reporting. They highlight the strength of
the civil law tradition, weak enforcement of
rules and lack of a disclosure philosophy in
the Turkish business culture.
This legal and cultural infrastructure seems
to be an important factor in the historic diffi-
culty with which Turkish firms have attracted
external capital. Table 1 reconstructed from
tables 2 and 8 in La Porta 
 
et al
 
. (1997) places
Turkey in the French origin legal system,
which has enjoyed the lowest access to ex-
ternal capital markets as well as the weakest
rule of law and investor rights protection
among the three other civil law and the com-
mon law traditions. The table also depicts that
while GDP growth is higher in Turkey than in
the other legal origins, access to external cap-
ital and measures of investor rights are lower
than even the average of the French origin
countries. Hence, while the fast growth rate in
the Turkish economy underscores the need to
    
access external debt and equity capital, the
table highlights its difficulty in countries
where enforcement of the rule of law and pro-
tection of investors’ rights are weak. The solu-
tion to this dilemma through observance of
good CG and T&D practices has been a major
motivation for this study.
Recent studies have observed that the weak
CG and disclosure tradition in Turkey have
continued until very recently. Ararat and Ugur
(2003) describe Turkey’s civil law tradition
and its inefficient and inconsistent regulatory
framework and the ensuing paucity of the rule
of law and its enforcement. They also elabo-
rate on the specific CG problems faced by
Turkish firms: the concentrated and pyramidal
ownership structure dominated by families;
ownership of many banks by these group
companies; inconsistent and opaque account-
ing and tax regulations; and the investor mis-
information caused by the absence of inflation
and consolidation accounting.
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 As a result of
 
Table 1: Access to external financing and measures of investor protection in Turkey and by legal origin
Panel A
 
:
 
a
 
 Aggregate mean values for the Turkish economy and stock market and comparison with different legal origins
External
cap/GNP
Domestic
firms/pop
IPOs/
pop
Debt/
GNP
GDP
growth
Log
GNP
Rule
of law
Antidirector
rights
One-share 
 
=
 
one-vote
Creditor
rights
Turkey 0.18 2.93 0.05 0.15 5.05 12.08 5.18 2 0 2
French origin
average
0.21 10.00 0.19 0.45 3.18 11.55 6.05 1.76 0.24 1.58
 
Panel B
 
: Tests of means (t-statistics)
Common vs 
civil law
3.12 3.16 3.97 1.33 1.23
 
−
 
1.06
 
−
 
0.77 5.24
 
−
 
0.03 3.61
English vs 
French origin
3.29 3.16 4.50 2.29 1.97
 
−
 
0.28 0.51 5.13
 
−
 
0.11 3.61
French vs 
German origin
 
−
 
2.38
 
−
 
1.85 0.78
 
−
 
3.39
 
−
 
1.96
 
−
 
2.48
 
−
 
2.55
 
−
 
0.47
 
−
 
0.45
 
−
 
1.29
French vs 
Scand. origin
 
−
 
0.91
 
−
 
3.31
 
−
 
5.45 0.82 0.97
 
−
 
0.33
 
−
 
20.80
 
−
 
1.25 2.50
 
−
 
0.60
 
Panel C:
 
b
 
 External funding at the firm level – median values for Turkish and different legal origin firms on the Worldscope 
database
Market cap/
sales
Market cap/
cash-flow
Debt/
sales
Debt/
cash-flow
WorldScope firms/
domestic firms
Turkey 0.46 2.87 0.11 0.50 0.12
French origin average 0.51 3.69 0.27 1.82 0.24
 
Panel D:
 
 Tests of means (t-statistics)
Common vs. civil law 1.04 0.72
 
−
 
0.60
 
−
 
0.50
England vs. France 1.10 2.20
 
−
 
0.36 0.53
French vs. German 
 
−
 
0.42
 
−
 
2.08
 
−
 
0.43
 
−
 
1.95
French vs. Scandinavia 0.54 0.45
 
−
 
0.06
 
−
 
1.17
 
a
 
Panels A and B are reconstructed from La Porta 
 
et al
 
. (1977), Table 2, presented for 49 countries and by legal origin.
 
b
 
Panels C and D are reconstructed from La Porta 
 
et al
 
. (1977), Table 8, presented for 49 countries and by legal origin. All values are
taken from the Worldscope database.
    
this infrastructure, agency conflicts are con-
centrated around weak minority shareholders’
and creditors’ rights, inconsistent and opaque
disclosure policies and lack of a culture of
voluntary disclosure, and convergence (in-
separability) of ownership and management.
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These create an environment that fosters cor-
ruption, share dilution, asset stripping, tunnel-
ling, insider trading and market manipulation.
Given these specific agency problems fos-
tered by the ownership and regulatory struc-
ture in large public Turkish firms, we concen-
trate on the disclosure and transparency
components of CG, which are the mechanisms
most likely to improve the protection of minor-
ity shareholders’ and the creditors’ rights.
McKinsey (2002) has carried out a global sur-
vey in which institutional investors were asked
to identify their CG priorities for companies
and policy makers. The survey, administered
in 2002, covers 201 responses from institutional
investors located in 31 countries. Table 2
reports the weights assigned by global institu-
tional investors to the top seven most impor-
tant CG factors for their investment decisions
in Turkey. The survey results depict a pattern
similar to the average of all countries sur-
veyed: timely, broad, understandable account-
ing disclosure and safeguarding of the share-
holders’ rights are the most important CG
priorities of institutional investors in their
decisions to invest in Turkish companies.
Unfortunately, Turkey has not scored high
in the scarce prior disclosure studies either,
as will be described below. We believe that
the aforementioned bleak picture is changing
fast as a result of the reforms in the financial
reporting environment, the recent stability in
Turkish politics, economic reforms, new regu-
lation and more effective enforcement, and in
this study we hope to quantify the expected
improvement in disclosure practices of ISE
firms. Some of these developments inlcude the
following:
(a) accelerated privatisation of State Eco-
nomic Enterprises.
(b) the creation of private pension funds that
are expected to serve as institutional
investors and enhance monitoring in
public firms.
(c) monitoring of banks by the Banking Regu-
lation and Supervison Agency (BRSA).
(d) the Capital Markets Board’s (CMB’s)
commitment to improvement of the regu-
latory framework.
(e) the CMB’s Corporate Governance Prin-
ciples, promulgated on a comply or ex-
plain basis and covering areas of dis-
closure, minority rights, board structure
and management oversight. The extent
of compliance and the reasons for non-
compliance to the principles would be
indicated in the 2004 annual reports pub-
lished in 2005.
(f) the establishment of the Turkish Account-
ing Standards Board and their mandate to
converge the local accounting standards
to the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) by 2005 in line with the
directives of the European Commission.
(g) Of course, Turkey’s recent progress in
achieving full membership of the EU will
provide the strongest inertia in establish-
ing the “rule of law” and improved CG
and T&D practices in Turkey.
 
A model of incentives for good CG/
T&D and our main hypothesis
 
Our basic model of the relationships between
the conflicts of interest and information asym-
metry between the stakeholders in the corpo-
rate form, CG/T&D practices as mechanisms
of checks and balances put in place to mitigate
them, firm performance and the local/global
economy is depicted in Figure 1. In this paper,
we explore the left-hand side of the model, i.e.
 
Table 2: CG priorities of institutional investors for their investment decisions in 30 countries
 
CG factors Turkey (%) All 30 countries surveyed (%)
Accounting disclosure 73 52
Shareholder equality 64 47
Market regulation and infrastructure 55 43
Takeover markets 45 23
Property rights 45 46
Credit information 36 29
Board independence 27 44
 
Sources: McKinsey & Company (2002) Global Investor Opinion Survey on Corporate Governance, and
Ararat and Ugur (2003).
    
the quality of T&D practices of ISE firms and
the firm-specific, agency-conflict related deter-
minants of their T&D scores.
Based on the agency theory of the firm and
viewing the firm as a nexus of contracts prone
to information asymmetry and conflicts of
interest between its stakeholders (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), we envision good CG/T&D
practices as mechanisms of checks and bal-
ances that have evolved to mitigate these
agency problems.
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 Such best practices are
expected to lower the agency costs, leading to
higher firm performance. In turn, the CG/T&D
practices themselves are shaped by the legal
traditions and regulations in the firm’s country
of domicile, as well as by international laws
and standards and the global economy. Not
only do these impose new CG/T&D rules and
best practices on the firm – such as the IFRS or
CG principles of the OECD – but they also
create new opportunities in the form of positive
NPV projects and ease of access to foreign
capital on the one hand, and new threats such
as regulatory intervention and litigation due
to, perhaps, non-compliance or misrepresenta-
tion. Since undertaking positive NPV projects
depends on the firm’s ability to tap the equity
and debt markets, and since capital will flow
to the highest return investments for a given
risk level, firms have the incentives to maxi-
mise the return to their capital suppliers while
minimising their perceived risk by putting in
place optimal CG mechanisms. Good T&D
mechanisms are thus set in place to protect the
rights of shareholders, creditors and other out-
siders from extraction of private benefits by
insiders based on their superior information.
This is expected to minimise the informational
asymmetry, increase investor awareness and
trust which, in turn, should reduce the uncer-
tainty of the returns to capital suppliers and
lead to lower cost of capital and hence higher
firm value (see, for example, Ashbaugh 
 
et al
 
.,
2004; Brown and Caylor, 2004; Berglof and
Pajuste, 2005).
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 This back and forth flow
between the economic units and capital sup-
pliers can be sustained only in the absence of
appropriation by insiders and other common
agency problems. Thus in our model, best CG/
T&D practices are used by firms not only to
signal their quality, but also as monitoring tools
to maintain their quality.
 
11
 
This simple model of incentives for good
CG/T&D practices has been well-studied and
reviewed extensively (see, for example, Watts
and Zimmerman, 1986; Healy and Palepu,
2001; Core, 2001; Rahman, 2002) in literature.
A recent example that draws on this literature
is the Albuquerque and Wang (2005) study
which develops a dynamic general equilib-
rium model to acknowledge the implications
of agency conflicts, through weak investor
protection, for security prices. They find that
countries with weaker investor protection
have higher overinvestment, lower values,
and higher expected returns, return volatility,
and interest rates. Ashbaugh 
 
et al
 
. (2004)
discuss the agency problems created by the
separation of ownership and control and
conclude that firms with better governance
present less agency risk to shareholders lead-
ing to lower cost of equity capital. Accord-
ingly, we expect to observe higher quality CG/
T&D practices in firms that have solved or that
are less susceptible to or that have committed
themselves to reduce their agency conflicts.
Accordingly, we pose the following hypoth-
esis, presented in the alternative form:
 
H
 
1
 
: Firms that have lower potential agency con-
flicts are expected to have higher T&D scores
 
Prior research and the choice of the 
agency conflict proxies
 
Since this paper adapts an index of disclosure
attributes to measure the T&D quality in a
 
Figure 1: A model of incentives for sound CG/T&D practices
    FIRM 
Nexus of 
contracts 
between 
stakeholders
CG/T&D 
mechanisms 
FIRM 
Accounting 
Performance 
Market 
Performance 
COUNTRY
Local 
Economy 
GLOBAL
Economy
    
specific country and also explores the deter-
minants of the T&D scores obtained, it is
closely related to both of these vast strands of
disclosure literature. Such indices have been
developed in several countries in the past 40
years, mostly carried out by rating firms,
financial analysts, academicians and database
companies. They are indeed far too many to
list here. Some examples are the disclosure
quality evaluations published by the Asso-
ciation for Investment Management and
Research (AIMR) over the decade 1980–90,
analysts’ ratings of firms’ disclosure policies,
disclosure quality evaluations published by
the 
 
Financial Post
 
 and the country-based index
of accounting quality and transparency devel-
oped by the Center for International Financial
Analysis and Research (the CIFAR Index) in
1993 and 1995. This latter index represents the
average number of 90 items included in the
annual reports of a sample of companies
covering 42 countries. It has been used by
many academicians in their cross-country
research to uncover the relationship between
accounting transparency, legal origin, culture
and economic performance (see, for example,
La Porta 
 
et al
 
., 1998; Hope, 2003). To our
knowledge, the CIFAR Index is the earliest
disclosure study that includes Turkey in its
sample. The average score of the 10 Turkish
companies is measured as 58.6, the second
lowest, after Portugal (53.7), among the 25
code-law countries and after India (54) among
the 17 common-law countries included in the
CIFAR Index. Of course, this survey was car-
ried out in 1995 and Turkey has come a long
way since then.
The more recent Patel 
 
et al
 
. (2002) study
which uses the T&D scores of S&P measured
at the end of 2000 covers 354 firms in 19 emerg-
ing markets. The study includes only 12
Turkish firms, covering only 64 percent of the
market capitalisation of Turkish companies
included in the S&P/International Finance
Corporation (IFC) Index. As of the end of 2000,
the average T&D score of these 12 firms is 34,
the third lowest after the five Latin American
countries and the Philippines – both groups
exhibiting an average score of 29.
More closely related to this study are the
recent surveys conducted by S&P to measure
a broader-based firm-specific T&D quality in
many regions of the world, often in collabora-
tion with academicians in respective countries.
In 2002, S&P Governance Services published
its first T&D study that includes companies in
the following S&P/IFC indices: Asia, Latin
America, Asia Pacific 100, TOPIX 150 (Japan).
Then came the surveys in Russia in 2002,
2003, and, as a result of continued interest
among investors, in 2004. Furthermore, in
2003, S&P released its study of the S&P Europe
350 companies.
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 Our main objective in this
study is to quantify the improvement in dis-
closure practices of Turkish firms in the recent
years by using a much larger sample (covering
100 percent of S&P/IFC Index market capital-
isation of Turkish firms) and a more compre-
hensive set of attributes encompassing not
only financial statement disclosure, but also
disclosure of other aspects of CG, i.e. owner-
ship, board and management structures and
processes, and covering the disclosure in
annual reports and company web sites.
Accordingly, we collaborated with S&P to
carry out the Turkish survey. Our and the
S&P’s roles in this study are explained at
the beginning of the next section. S&P and the
Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey
(CGFT) of Sabanci University announced the
results to the public in a press release in May
2002 and S&P officially published the results
in their newsletter Ratings Direct dated 6/6/
2005.
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This research is also closely related to a
large body of accounting and finance litera-
ture that investigates the causes and conse-
quences of voluntary disclosure. In this paper,
we limit our investigation to the agency
theory-based determinants of discretionary
disclosure reviewed in seminal studies such
as Verrecchia (1983, 2001), Healy and Palepu
(2001) and Core (2001). The theory predicts
that even though self-serving managers have
incentives to disclose their insider informa-
tion, they will withhold private information
when disclosure is too costly and that there is
a strong country effect in what companies
disclose (for empirical evidence on country-
based differences see, for example, Berglof
and Pajuste, 2005; Hope 
 
et al.
 
, 2003). Prior
research has shown that there is also consider-
able within-country variation in disclosure
driven by firm characteristics.
We draw on agency research, studies on
firm-specific determinants of disclosure, and
we consider the specific agency problems
faced by Turkish firms in our choice of the
relevant agency conflict proxies. There exists
an extensive body of prior research on deter-
minants of disclosure that has accumulated
over the past 40 years, a review of which is
beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we will
just mention a few important or recent
papers.
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 The variables we explore under
two categories of agency conflicts are size,
measured as market value of equity (MVE);
market-to-book value of equity ratio (MTB,
measured as MVE/BVE); firm performance
measured as earnings before interest and
taxes/total assets (ROA) and net income/
owner’s equity (ROE); leverage measured as
    
total liabilities/total assets (TL/TA); and free
cash flow (FCF):
 
Proxies for conflict with minority 
shareholders and regulatory institutions
 
Size and profitability
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that
larger companies are more visible and thus
they are politically more sensitive. We expect
larger and more profitable firms to have
higher TDS because they are closely followed
by financial intermediaries, have more com-
prehensive disclosure standards in place to
minimise the political costs of noncompliance
with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples (GAAP), and can better afford the cost
of voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, profit-
able firms are likely to have less to hide from
their constituents and thus are expected to
employ less earnings management.
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 Many
empirical studies have associated disclosure
quantity and quality, measured by a disclo-
sure index, with firm size and performance
and many have investigated the relationship
between firm characteristics and agency
problems. In their well-cited empirical work,
Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that analyst
ratings of disclosure are higher for firms that
perform well, for larger firms, firms with
a weaker relation between annual stock
returns and earnings, and firms that issue
securities. Doyle 
 
et al
 
. (2005) and Bryan and
Lilien (2005) document that material weak-
nesses in internal control are more likely for
smaller, younger, financially weaker, fast
growth firms and worse performers. Simi-
larly, using voluntary segment disclosure
as a proxy for transparency, Sidney and
Bertrand (2004) find that concentrated board
ownership results in low disclosure and this
effect is stronger when firm performance is
poor. Black 
 
et al
 
. (2006) investigates the cross-
sectional differences in Korean firms’ CG
practices and again finds that firm size, risk
and long-term profitability and need for
equity capital are positively related to better
CG. Hope (2003) observes a positive correla-
tion between firm size and the CIFAR index
for annual report disclosure. Similarly,
Hossain 
 
et al
 
. (2005) has found that voluntary
disclosure of prospective information is
related to firm size. Veronina 
 
et al
 
. (2005) is a
recent study which is similar to the present
one in that it measures the transparency
practices of 102 listed Russian firms in 2001
and also investigates the cross-sectional dif-
ferences in their transparency scores. Using
a checklist of 441 items from International
Accounting Standards (IAS), they find that
use of a Big-5 auditor, foreign listing, size,
government shareholdings and indepen-
dence of CEO and board chair are associated
with transparency.
 
Market-to-book ratio
 
MTB ratio has been used in the literature as a
proxy for risk, growth potential, unreported
intangibles and firm prospects assessed by
market participants. A low ratio is associated
with low growth potential and high free cash
flows under the discretion of insiders. Such
firms have little need for external finance and,
thus, voluntary disclosure (Core, 2001). There-
fore, within the agency theory framework, one
should expect to see a positive relationship
between MTB and T&D scores. For example,
Berglof and Pajuste (2005) report that more
information is publicly available in larger
firms, firms with lower leverage, higher
financial performance, higher market-to-book
ratios and more concentrated ownership. On
the other hand, a low MTB can also be con-
sidered a sign of undervaluation by the
market. The equity’s market value might be
low relative to its book value not because of
the firm’s low growth potential but simply
because future prospects of the firm are not
properly communicated to the public or there
is a general undervaluation in the market due
to local economic uncertainties. For example,
the cash flows from valuable intangible assets
such as human resources, internally generated
patents and R&D activities, which are not
recognised in financial statements in line with
GAAP, may not have been impounded in
prices in an inefficient information setting. In
such cases, management may take actions to
increase transparency and put better CG
practices in action to remedy this unwanted
perception and its negative effect on firm
value. Furthermore, low MTB may be the
result of an increase in book value of equity
due to recently issued capital and several
researchers have found that firms disclose
more when they have recently issued capital
(see, for example, Frankel 
 
et al
 
., 1995). Con-
trary to the predictions of agency theory, this
argument suggests a negative relationship
between MTB and T&D scores.
 
16
 
Proxies for conflict between the 
shareholders and managers and creditors
 
Leverage
 
Agency theory also suggests a strong link
between leverage and disclosure (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). In highly levered firms, there
    
is a higher demand for and supply of informa-
tion and creditors themselves produce infor-
mation about the borrower.
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 Furthermore, as
a result of monitoring by informed creditors
and strict debt covenants, the debtor firm has
to commit itself to the discipline of debt pay-
ments and cannot as freely expropriate the free
cash flows (Jensen, 1986). Bebchuck 
 
et al
 
. (2000)
suggest that controlling-minority structures
(CMSs) like stock pyramids, cross-ownerships
and dual class shares, such as those found in
Turkey, could benefit from the constraining
function of leverage and thus reduce the high
agency costs associated with such ownership
structures. Thus we expect a higher commit-
ment to reduce the agency conflicts and thus
higher disclosure in firms with higher leverage
even in CMSs. However, empirical studies
have provided conflicting results. For example,
while Ho and Wong (2001) found no relation-
ship between disclosure and leverage, several
studies have found a significant relationship
(for a positive relationship, see, for example,
Hossain 
 
et al
 
., 1994 and Dellas and Hess, 2005;
for a weakly negative one see Hope, 2003).
We have no priors for the large family-owned
group firms, some of which can be considered
CMSs and many of whom own their own
banks. When the bank is directly or indirectly
owned by the borrower, the role of leverage as
a monitoring and/or disciplining device – both
for the majority owner group and the manage-
ment team – is suspect.
 
Free cash flow
 
FCF, defined as the cash flow at the discretion
of management after all positive NPV projects
are undertaken, has been an extensively used
measure of the agency conflict between self-
serving managers and diffuse shareholders.
Firms with higher FCFs are subject to higher
agency costs, and this results in undervalua-
tion of the firm’s equity. Indeed, firms with
higher FCFs and lower MTB ratios have been
targets for leveraged buyout transactions (see
Lehn and Poulsen (1989), for example). Our
hypothesis predicts a positive relationship
between TD score and FCF measure as
companies with accumulated cash have an
incentive to be as transparent/informative as
possible through their disclosure to mitigate
the negative impact of the excessive cash
holding on the equity value. However, when
concentrated ownership structures like those
in the ISE do not leave the control of cash in
the hands of managers, the role of FCF as a
source of agency conflict between the man-
agers and shareholders and its role in dis-
closure practices are suspect.
 
Sample, data requirements and 
methods of analysis
 
Our sample consists of the 52 largest market
cap and most liquid (based on trade volume)
corporations traded in the ISE, 44 of which are
currently followed by S&P and included in
their S&P/IFC Emerging Markets Index. The
study analyses disclosure practices of these
firms from an investor perspective. It therefore
focuses on sources of information that are
most readily accessible by local and inter-
national investors – typically the latest avail-
able English language and local language
company annual reports and the English and
Turkish websites. The study leverages S&P’s
expertise in corporate governance, index con-
struction and financial analysis. We carried
out the study ourselves but make use of their
list of 98 best T&D attributes, use their classi-
fication of overall T&D into three subcatego-
ries, and utilise their scoring methodology.
Transparency and disclosure are evaluated
by searching for the inclusion of best practice
information items (“attributes”) in the 2003
annual reports and websites of our sample
firms. Our primary data source is the annual
reports prepared in English. If we do not find
a specific information item in this primary
source, then we sequentially search for that
item in the English website, then in the Turk-
ish annual report and finally in the Turkish
website. As S&P uses US disclosure best prac-
tices as an implicit benchmark, we have modi-
fied their list of 98 attributes used in prior
surveys. A similar modification was also car-
ried out in Russia. The list of attributes has
been extended to 106 information items in the
case of Turkey in order to incorporate some
local market, culture and regulation-specific
issues: the CMB’s new CG principles, concen-
trated ownership due to family ownership
and founders’ shares, cross-holding relation-
ships between the holding companies and
their subsidiaries, high inflation rate and the
mandate to follow IFRS starting with the first
interim reports in 2005.
The 106 attributes, grouped into the follow-
ing three sub-categories, are presented in
Appendix 1:
 
1. Ownership structure and investor relations
(OwnStr)
2. Financial transparency and information disclo-
sure (FinDisc)
3. Board and management structure and processes
(BrdMgmt)
 
The inclusion of each attribute is scored on
a trinary basis as “yes” (included) or “no” (not
included) and “N/A” (not applicable) to en-
sure objectivity. Each “yes” answer is equal to
    
one point and the overall T&D score (TDS) for
each firm is calculated as:
(1)
where
 
j
 
 
 
=
 
 the attribute category subscript, 
 
j
 
 
 
=
 
 1, 2, 3,
 
k
 
 = the attribute subscript, k = 1, . . . , 106,
Sjk = the number of info items disclosed 
(answered as “yes”) by the firm in each 
category, and 
TOTS = the total maximum possible “yes” 
answers for each firm.18
Companies are finally ranked based on their
TDS in deciles. An overall ranking will reflect
the total number of the 106 maximum possible
attributes disclosed in a company’s annual
report and website. Individual rankings for
each of the three sub-categories are calculated
likewise by reference to the maximum pos-
sible number of yes answers for each sub-
category. We use the TDS rankings to repre-
sent the market participants’ assessments of
the completeness, clarity and transparency of
a firm’s disclosure policies.
In exploring the determinants of TDS, we
conduct a cross-sectional analysis of the re-
lationship between the T&D scores and the
firm-specific proxies for agency variables dis-
cussed above. Both financial statement price/
return data are obtained from the electronic
database in the ISE website.
Results
In Table 3, we present a comparison of the
average scores of Turkish firms with those of
other geographical regions of the world and
with European countries in the Europe 300
index of the S&P/IFC database. The scores are
obtained from S&P’s Transparency and Dis-
closure Studies in 2001–2002. The comparison
indicates that UK and US composite have the
highest rankings globally. Continental Europe
and developed Asia are somewhat lower and
emerging Asia and Latin America have the
lowest disclosure scores, particularly in terms
of Board and Management disclosures. The
scores vary a lot between regions and between
different categories of T&D. In all regions
and countries reported, including Turkey, the
highest T&D scores are observed in the
FinDisc category, while the lowest scores are
obtained in the OwnStr and BrdMgmt cate-
gories in all regions, except for Japan, Latin
America, Emerging Asia and Turkey. In these
exception regions/countries, BrdMgmt scores
are the lowest. Apart from Japan, these are all
emerging markets.
TDS TOTS= ∑∑ Sjk
kj
The average T&D scores of sample ISE firms
are reported in the last row of Panel A. While
the overall score is 41 out of 100 points, the
OwnStr, FinDisc, and BrdMgmt scores are 39,
64 and 20, respectively. Overall, Turkish com-
panies have a disclosure pattern similar to
Emerging Asia, but have higher FinDisc and
lower BrdMgmt scores. S&P also assigns a
decile score to each region/country by record-
ing the scores in deciles while rounding them
up to the next highest digit. The decile scores
of all reported regions and countries, includ-
ing the 350 firms in 15 European countries and
Russia are given in Panels B and C. In compar-
ison to other European countries’ overall T&D
score in deciles (6), Turkey has a somewhat
lower average score (5), which is comparable
to many continental European countries.
Descriptive statistics
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for
our sample. The average 2003 overall TD
scores and average scores in the three T&D
categories depicted in Panel A indicate that the
transparency and disclosure scores of ISE com-
panies are not impressive, especially in terms
of board and management structures and pro-
cesses. The highest scores are obtained in the
category of financial transparency and infor-
mation disclosure, which is not surprising as
most of the attributes in that category are man-
datory disclosures required by the CMB’s
accounting principles that all publicly traded
firms are required to follow and which, more
or less, follow IAS. We also include the mean,
median, min. and max. values of our firm-
specific agency conflict proxies such as size,
market-to-book ratio, leverage, accounting
profitability of the sample firms as defined
earlier. Most of the sample firms have recently
become public firms and on average they have
traded on the ISE for 11.5 years. They have
slightly negative returns in 2003 due to the
continuation of the economic slump of 2002;
their return on assets and return on equity
ratios have been moderate, on average 6 per-
cent and 17 percent, respectively; and their
mean leverage about 50 percent.
Evidence on the relation between agency 
problems and the T&D scores
In this section, we test if potential conflicts of
interest caused by agency problems explain
the differences in the TDS scores by estimat-
ing the following regression equation, where i
is the firm subscript, j stands for the overall
score (and scores in each sub-category) and
there is no time subscript as the regressions
are run for only 2003 values of the inde-
pendent variables. Our explanatory variables
are free cash-flow (FCF), accounting per-
formance (ROE), leverage (TL/TA), market
capitalisation (MVE), and market-to-book
ratio (MTB), as defined earlier:
(2)
TDS TL TA MVE MTB
ROE FCF
,i j i i i
i i
= + + +
+ + +
b b b b
b b e
0 1 2 3
4 5
TDS ratings are based on 2003 annual reports.
Consistent with this, all the explanatory
variables are measured by using 2003 end of
year values. This is also consistent with our
hypothesised relationship between the TDS
scores and the variables included in the model.
For example, firms with higher realised profits
over the year tend to share more information
Table 3: Comparison of T&D scores in different geographical regions with Turkey
Panel A: The scores in three categories of T&D and the composite scores (in %)
Composite
score
Ownership
structure
Financial
disclosure
Board and
management
Number 
of firms
Europe 58 46 73 51 351
UK 70 54 81 70 124
Non-UK 51 41 69 41 227
US (annuals) 42 25 66 31 500
US (combined data sources) 70 52 77 78 500
Japan 61 70 76 37 150
Asia-Pacific 48 41 60 42 99
Latin America 31 28 58 18 89
Emerging Asia 40 39 54 27 253
Turkey 41 39 64 20 52
Panel B: The composite scores in deciles for S&P Europe 350 and other regions
Countries/regions Number of companies Average decile scores
UK 133 8
Austria 2 5
Belgium 7 5
Switzerland 20 5
Deutschland 34 5
Denmark 6 5
Spain 15 5
Finland 5 7
France 43 6
Greece 2 4
Ireland 4 8
Italy 27 5
Netherlands 26 6
Norway 3 6
Portugal 7 5
Sweden 16 7
Europea 350 6
Continental Europeb 217 5
S&P 500 (US) 500 7
Australia 7
Russia 5
Turkey 52 5
Source: S&P’s Transparency and Disclosure Study, 2002 (with the exception of results for Turkey).
aRepresents the sum of all the above listed European companies.
bExcludes the 133 UK companies.
with the public, naturally in their current state-
ments. Similarly, firms with low MTB ratios
based on end of year figures would tend to be
more transparent both about their financials
and managerial practices in their immediate
annual reports to mitigate any miscommuni-
cation about their future prospects that could
well be the reason for a poor MTB ratio.
We report the results with the last four vari-
ables only. The FCF variable was excluded
from the regression equations for two reasons:
First, we were able to find information only
on 31 firms to estimate an appropriate FCF
measure. However, as far as the signs and
significance of the coefficients are concerned,
our initial model that included FCF provided
similar results to those reported here, but the
coefficient of FCF was not significant. Our sec-
ond reason for excluding FCF stems from the
institutional structure of Turkish corporations.
Since, as discussed earlier, family members
usually sit in the highest executive positions
and in the boards, the rest of the managers are
not likely to have much power and authority
over the use of free cash flows. As a result,
agency problem/cost associated with FCF in
a typical corporate form – with diffused
ownership and fully delegated decision mak-
ing authority to the management team – is
somewhat limited. This argument defies the
role of FCF as a proxy for agency conflict.
Table 5 shows that our model is a valid one
with an F-value of 4.06. Given the usual limi-
tations of multiple regression analysis used
in our study, we checked our independent
variables for a possible correlation. With the
exception of a ROE with leverage – which
seem to have a moderate positive correlation
– no significant correlation exists among the
variables. Furthermore, usual diagnostics
applied to residuals show no violation of
homoscedasticity or normality assumptions of
the models.
We find that size and market-to-book are
significant in explaining the variation in TDS,
while leverage is not. We conjecture that larger
firms with higher followings by investors and
with higher political costs of non-compliance
or litigation threat have higher quality disclo-
sures, as expected. On the other hand, the
negative relation between MTB and TDS indi-
cates that riskier, low growth or undervalued
firms also disclose more to signal their quality
to perhaps counter the negative assessments
of the market participants about their pros-
pects. Leverage is not significant in explaining
the changes in TDS, probably due to loss of
power in the tests due to the families’ owner-
ship of banks from whom they obtain credit.19
When we add either ROA or ROE to the
model, they both have significant coefficients
as we expected.20
Table 4: Descriptive statistics: T&D scores and financial profiles of 52 ISE firms in 2003
Variables N Min Max Mean SD
Panel A: T&D scores
TDS-overall 52 16.19 71.43 41.11 11.06
TDS-ownership structure 52 3.13 88.00 38.57 18.26
TDS-financial disclosure 52 19.44 86.11 64.21 14.25
TDS-board & management 52 2.70 54.05 20.42 12.18
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the agency conflict proxies used
ROA 49 −0.047 0.45 0.059 0.087
ROE 50 −0.332 1.89 0.175 0.274
Market-to-book (MTB) 47 0.009 18.10 1.96 2.76
Debt ratio (DTA) 50 0.02 0.89 0.51 0.24
Market value of equity (MVE) 49 157,351,677 18,875,025,000 1,985,949,851 3,180,430,804
TDS = Transparency and disclosure scores of the sample firms measured in three disclosure categories based
on the 106 question survey presented in Appendix 1 and the S&P scoring methodology. MVE = (year end
close price) * (Number of outstanding shares) and measured at the end of 2003 in million TL. MTB
ratio = market value of equity/book-value of equity. DTA(leverage) = total liabilities/total assets.
ROA = firm performance measure defined as earnings before interest and taxes/total assets. ROE = firm
performance indicator measured as net income/owner’s equity. All variables are measured as of 31
December 2003.
Apart from their explanatory power for the
overall scores, size and market-to-book are
also significant in explaining the ownership
structure and board and management struc-
ture sub-category scores. None of the variables
tried are significant in explaining differences
in financial disclosure scores probably because
the information items included in this sub-
category are mostly mandatory disclosure
items (with the exception of voluntary early
adoption of IFRS, consolidated reporting and
inflation accounting) and hence there is less
of a variation in these scores.
Summary and concluding remarks
Collaborating with S&P, we score the T&D
practices of 52 large and liquid ISE firms in
three categories of disclosure by examining
their 2003 annual reports and websites. We
conclude that the T&D quality of Turkish firms
are at best moderate with the highest and low-
est scores observed in the Financial Disclosure
and Board and Management processes cate-
gories, respectively. The results indicate that
the annual reports and websites are weak in
terms of voluntary disclosure. In the explor-
atory part of our study that investigates the
firm-specific determinants of the TDS, we find
that while size, accounting profitability and
market-to-book ratio explain the differences in
the scores in the ownership and board and
management sub-categories as well as in over-
all scores, leverage remains insignificant in all
four models.
There are several limitations of the study.
Our sample is small in size and, by construc-
tion, composed of the largest and most
followed firms in the ISE and thus may not
be representative of the population of Turkish
firms. Second, we concentrate on a subset of
disclosure and transparency attributes in
annual reports and websites to the exclusion
of timeliness, truthfulness and accessibility of
information and other sources of CG informa-
tion. Finally, the study gives, at best, a snap-
shot picture of disclosure quality in ISE firms
and its relation to firm-specific variables
because the tests are based on only one year’s
data. Thus, it lacks longitudinal generalis-
ability and ignores a possible lead lag relation-
ship in the link between T&D scores and our
agency conflict proxies. To mitigate some of
these limitations and enrich our insight, we
will expand our data set to ISE-100 firms and
replicate the study in 2005. Our expectation
is that the T&D scores and their relationship
with our agency conflict proxies will improve
due to the required compliance with IFRS and
the CMB’s CG principles for public firms in
2005. We are also planning to investigate the
right-hand side of our model presented in
Figure 1, that is the relationship between the
T&D scores and firm-level and country-level
financial performance. We are particularly
interested in unveiling whether good T&D
increases the firm’s and the market’s access to
domestic and foreign capital and hence leads
to higher levels of growth.
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Notes
1. Some local examples are the recent resolve to
rewrite the Turkish Commercial Code that has
been in effect since 1957 and the new CG Prin-
ciples of the Turkish Capital Markets Board, which
will be effective in 2005. Another one is
the recent Reporting Standard (RS) 1 “The
Operating and Financial Review” in the UK.
Announcing its publication, Ian Mackintosh,
the Chairman of the ASB, said: “This reporting
standard represents an important step forward
in encouraging greater transparency and more
open communication between companies and
their shareholders … This should be of great
benefit to many parties” (Association of Inter-
national Accountants, 2005).
2. See, for example, the G-Index of Gompers et al.
(2003) and Gov-7 of Brown and Caylor (2005).
3. In their official newsletter dated 6/6/05,
entitled “Corporate Governance: the Turkish
Transparency and Disclosure Survey”, Stan-
dard & Poor’s states that they view corporate
transparency as an important factor affecting a
company’s attractiveness to investors, and as a
vital element of corporate governance.
4. Yurtoglu (2003) documents that families ulti-
mately own about 80 percent of the 305 compa-
nies traded in the ISE as of 2001.
5. In line with these three categories, T&D is
defined as adherence to the principles of
“full-disclosure” and “openness and informa-
tiveness” in public presentation of financial
statements as well as the ownership and board/
management structures and processes followed
by the company. As such, an attempt to quan-
tify it, like ours, would not measure the truth-
fulness of the information disclosed in the
financial reports or the actual quality of board
and management structures and investor
relations; that is, it does not measure the “CG
quality” of the firm. Implicitly assuming truth-
ful disclosure, it basically measures the “quality
of disclosure” of its governance and financial
reporting mechanisms.
6. An important reason for exploring the TD
quality using data from a single country is that
multi-country studies may yield mixed results
as a result of their differences in terms of the
sizes and liberalisation of their markets and
institutions, political and economic risk ex-
posure, the average market capitalisation and
their reporting standards. We use only ISE data
in this study to control for these differences that
are expected to affect both the TD scores of
firms and the variables we use as agency con-
flict proxies. Yurtoglu (2003) specifically states
that Turkey is especially suitable for exploring
the link with agency costs because it shares
many features of weak CG such as concen-
trated family ownership, weak regulation and
enforcement, pyramidal groups and dual class
shares.
7. In large ISE firms, the conflict between creditors
and shareholders has not been an issue because
many banks are owned by the business-groups
themselves that often have control over the
banks’ lending decisions. Furthermore, family
members usually sit in the highest executive
positions and in the boards and the rest of
the managers do not have much power and
authority over the use of free cash flows. As a
result, the manager–shareholder conflict is also
nonexistent.
8. Such stock pyramids, cross-ownership and
dual-class voting and non-voting equity struc-
tures are predominant in Turkey. Bebchuk et al.
(2000) call these controlling-minority structures
and posit that they lead to much larger agency
costs than both highly leveraged and concen-
trated ownership structures.
9. This is similar to the view in Florackis and
Ozkan (2004) that investigates managerial
ownership and compensation, and ownership
concentration as two corporate governance
devices that mitigate agency costs.
10. Another advantage of compliance with good
T&D practices is that it mitigates the political
costs of non-compliance and hence reduces the
risk of higher taxes, litigation and too much
regulation. Field et al. (2005) indeed find that
disclosure deters certain types of litigation.
11. Taken literally, the model predicts limitless
disclosure which, of course, is prohibited by its
cost. Only to the extent the aforementioned
benefits of disclosure exceed its costs, we expect
the firm to increase its voluntary disclosure and
transparency. Furthermore, excessive trans-
parency may limit the competitive advantage of
the firm and the limitations in place against
extraction of private benefits by insiders may
reduce the incentives of controlling share-
holders to undertake positive NPV projects and
to monitor the managers (see, for example,
Core, 2001 for the trade-off between lower cost
of capital and litigation costs against higher
proprietary and incentive costs).
12. Standard & Poor’s (2002) states that the S&P’s
Transparency and Disclosure Study will even-
tually cover about 1600 companies which rep-
resent approximately 70 percent of the world’s
tradable market capitalisation.
13. The newsletter entitled “Corporate Gover-
nance: the Turkish Transparency and Disclo-
sure Survey” discusses their scoring method-
ology, T&D studies carried out in other coun-
tries, announces the top 5 companies in the ISE,
lists the most and the least practised ones
among the 106 T&D attributes, includes a table
of cross-country comparisons which we extend
as our Table 3 and a reproduction of our Table 4,
Panel A.
14. The reader is referred to a very useful and
comprehensive review of empirical literature
entitled “Developments of firm-to-outsider
communication research” by Schadewitz and
Blevins (2005) on the web.
15. Faulkender et al. (2005) finds that the extent of
the potential disagreement between investors
and managers depends on prior firm perfor-
mance.
16. Size and book-to-market ratio are also impor-
tant variables that explain excess returns
both in developed and many emerging markets
(Fama and French, 1993, 1998), including
Turkey (Aksu and Onder, 2003). As such, these
two variables may also act as controls for this
omitted variable.
17. This is especially true for firms with significant
amount of bank debt in their capital structure.
Recent theories of financial intermediation have
focused on the role of banks to produce and
transmit information in capital markets when
there are informational asymmetries. Either
because of their information-gathering cost
advantages or intimate customer relationship
developed over time, banks are assumed to
have access to valuable information that may
not be available to other market participants.
18. In determining the denominator TOTS, we
exclude the N/A answers for info items not
applicable to the firm. For example, in question
35, under BrdMgmt category, “Whether board
members are employees of parent co.?” is not
included in the total possible score (TOTS) in
case the company is not a holding company.
Similarly question 36 in the Financial Disclo-
sure category, “List of group transactions” is
excluded from TOTS if the firm is not a group
firm.
19. When we exclude the highly leveraged banks
and financial institutions from our sample leav-
ing only 43 firms, the coefficient of leverage has
the correct positive sign and becomes weakly
significant. This is reasonable as high leverage
does not necessarily mean financial distress or
monitoring intensity in banks.
20. As the ROE measure already incorporates the
effect of leverage, hence, might be a possible
reason behind the insignificance of leverage, we
tried the runs with ROA instead of ROE. This
did not have any effect on the signs and signi-
ficances of the coefficients in the model. We
also tried an indicator variable for whether
the company is a group firm with a highly
concentrated ownership. This was found to be
insignificant.
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Appendix 1: List of attributes used in the survey
Ownership
1) No. of issued and o/s ordinary shares?
2) No. of issued and o/s other shares (pref, non-vot, recap)?
3) Par value of each ordinary share?
4) Par value of each other share (pref, non-vot, recap)?
5) No. of auth but unissued & o/s ordinary shares?
6) No. of auth but unissued & o/s other shares?
7) Top 1 shareholder?
8) Top 3 shareholders?
9) Top 5 shareholders?
10) Top 10 shareholders?
11) No. and identity of shareholders holding more than 3%?
12) No. and identity of shareholders holding more than 5%?
13) No. and identity of shareholders holding more than 10%?
14) Identity of shareholders holding at least 50%?
15) Float %?
16) Descriptions of share classes?
17) Review of shareholders by type? 
18) Percentage of cross-ownership?
19) Existence of Corporate Governance Charter or Code of Best Practice?
20) Reproduction of its Corporate Governance Charter/Code of Best Practice?
21) Mention of Articles of Association?
22) Details about Articles of Association (i.e. Charter Articles of Incorp)?
23) Voting rights for each voting share?
24) How or who nominates directors to board?
25) How shareholders convene an EGM?
26) Procedure for putting Inquiry Rights to the board?
27) Procedure for proposals at shareholders meetings?
28) Review of last shareholders meeting (e.g. minutes)?
29) Calendar of important shareholder dates?
30) Any (in)formal voting agreements or blocks (relevant to family ownership)?
31) Shareholding by senior managers?
32) Ultimate beneficiaries in case of institutional, co. or cross shareholdings?
Financial disclosure
1) Its accounting policies?
2) Accounting standards it uses for its accounts?
3) Accounts according to the local accounting standards?
4) Accounts according to internationally recognised accounting standard (IAS/GAAP)?
5) B/S according to international accounting standard (IAS/GAAP)?
6) I/S according to international accounting standard (IAS/GAAP)?
7) C/F according to international accounting standard (IAS/GAAP)?
8) Accounts adjusted for inflation?
9) Basic earnings forecast of any kind?
10) Detailed earnings forecast?
11) Financial information on a quarterly basis?
12) Segment analysis (broken down by business line)?
13) Name of its auditing firm?
14) Reproduction of the auditors’ report?
15) How much it pays in audit fees to the auditor?
16) Any non-audit fees paid to auditor?
17) Consolidated financial statements (or only the parent/holding company)?
18) Methods of asset valuation?
19) Information on method of fixed assets depreciation?
20) List of affiliates in which it holds a minority stake?
21) Reconciliation of its domestic accounting standards to IAS/US GAAP?
22) Ownership structure of affiliates?
23) Details of the kind of business it is in?
24) Details of the products or services produced/provided?
25) Output in physical terms disclosed? (No. of users, etc.)
26) Characteristics of assets employed? 
27) Efficiency indicators (ROA, ROE, etc.)?
28) Any industry-specific ratios?
29) Discussion of corporate strategy?
30) Any plans for investment in the coming year(s)?
31) Detailed info about investment plans in the coming year(s)?
32) Output forecast of any kind?
33) Overview of trends in its industry?
34) Its market share for any or all of its businesses? 
35) List/register of related party transactions?
36) List/register of group transactions?
37) English Annual report on the web site?
Board and management
1) List of board members (names)?
2) Details about directors (other than name/title)?
3) Details about current employment/position of directors provided?
4) Details about previous employment/positions provided?
5) When each of the directors joined the board?
6) Classification of directors as an executive or an outside director?
7) Named chairman listed?
8) Details about the chairman (other than name/title)?
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9) Details about role of the board of directors at the company?
10) List of matters reserved for the board?
11) List of board committees?
12) Existence of an audit committee?
13) Names on audit committee?
14) Existence of a remuneration/compensation committee?
15) Names on remuneration/compensation committee?
16) Existence of a nomination committee?
17) Names on nomination committee?
18) Existence of other internal audit functions besides Audit committee?
19) Existence of a strategy/investment/finance committee?
20) No. of shares in the company held by directors?
21) Review of last board meeting (e.g. minutes)?
22) Whether they provide director training?
23) Decision-making process of directors’ pay?
24) Specifics of directors’ salaries (e.g. numbers)?
25) Form of directors’ salaries (e.g. cash, shares, etc.)?
26) Specifics on performance-related pay for directors?
27) Decision-making of managers’ (not Board) pay?
28) Specifics of managers’ (not on Board) salaries (e.g. numbers)?
29) Form of managers’ (not on Board) salaries?
30) Specifics on performance-related pay for managers?
31) List of senior managers (not on the Board of Directors)?
32) Backgrounds of senior managers?
33) Details of the CEOs contracted?
34) No. of shares held by managers in other affiliated companies?
35) Whether board members are employees of parent company (in case company is a 
consolidated affiliate/subsidiary)?
36) Whether any group policies exist re. nature of relationship between parent and affiliates (with 
respect to CG of affiliates/subsidiaries)?
37) Whether any members of senior management are related (family, joint business, etc.) to any 
major shareholder?
Company Ticker
symbol
Sector
code
Sector
Ak Enerji Elektik Uretimi 
Otoproduktor Gurbu A.S.
AKENR 55 Utilities
Akbank T.A.S. AKBNK 40 Financials
Akcansa A.S. AKCNS 15 Materials
Aksa Akrilik Kimya Sanayil A.S. AKSA 25 Consumer discretionary
Aksigorta AKGRT 40 Financials
Alarko Holding A.S. ALARK 20 Industrials
Anadolu Efes Biracilik ve Malt Sanayii AEFES 30 Consumer staples
Arcelik A.S. ARCLK 25 Consumer discretionary
Aselsan Askeri Elektronik Sanayii ve 
Ticaret A.S.
ASELS 20 Industrials
Aygaz A.S. AYGAZ 55 Utilities
Beko Elektronik BEKO 25 Consumer discretionary
Bosch Fren BFREN 20 Industrials
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Brisa Bridgestone Sabanci Lastik 
San.ve Tic.
BRISA 25 Consumer discretionary
BSH Profilo Elektrikli Gerecleri BSPRO 25 Consumer discretionary
Celebi Hava Servisi A.S. CLEBI 20 Industrials
Cimsa Cimento San ve Tic. A.S. CIMSA 15 Materials
Dogus Holding DOAS Construction, wholesale, retail
Dogan Holding A.S. DOHOL 20 Industrials
Dogan Yayin Holding A.S. DYHOL 25 Consumer discretionary
Eczacibasi Ilac San ve Tic. A.S. ECILC 35 Health Care
Enka Insaat ve Sanayi AS ENKAI 20 Industrials
Eregli Demir ve Celik Fabrikalari A.S. AEFES 15 Materials
Finansbank FINBN 40 Financials
Ford Otosan Otomobil Sanayi A.S. FROTO 25 Consumer discretionary
Haci Omer Sabanci Holding A.S. SAHOL 40 Financials
Hurriyet Gazetecilik ve Matbaacilik 
A.S.
HURGZ 25 Consumer discretionary
Ihlas Holding IHLAS 40 Fiancials
Is Gayrimenkul Yatirum Ortakligi A.S. ISGYO 40 Financials
Kardemir 15 Materials
Koc Holding A.S. KCHOL 20 Industrials
Kordsa Sabanci Dupont Endustri KORDS 25 Consumer discretionary
Migros A.S. MIGRS 30 Consumer staples
Netas Northern Electric 
Telekomunikasyon A.S.
NETAS 45 Information technology
Petrokimya Holding A.S. PETKM 15 Materials
Petrol Ofisi PTOFS 10 Energy
Sasa Dupont Sabanci Polyester SASA 15 Materials
T. Garanti Bankasi GARAN 40 Financials
T. Sise Cam Fabrikalari A.S. SISE 25 Consumer discretionary
Tansas Perakende Magazcilik Ticaret 
A.S.
TNSAS 30 Consumer staples
Tofas Turk Otomobil Fabrikasi A.S. TOASO 25 Consumer discretionary
Trakya Cam Sanayil A.S. TRKCM 20 Industrials
Turk Traktor TTRAK 20 Industrials
Tupras Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri A.S. TUPRS 10 Energy
Turk Dis Ticaret Bankasi DISBA 40 Financials
Turk Hava Yollari A.S. THYAO 20 Industrials
Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri AS TCELL 50 Telecommunication services
Turkiye is Bankasi A.S. ISBNK 40 Financials
Ulker ULKER 30 Consumer staples
Vestel Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. VESTL 25 Consumer discretionary
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi A.S. YKBNK 40 Financials
Yazici Holding YAZIC Manuf., wholesale, retail 
Zorlu Enerji ZOREN 55 Utilities
Company Ticker
symbol
Sector
code
Sector
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